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I.
INTRODUCTION

MedImmune v. Genentech changed the landscape for licensors and
licensees of patented technology. 2 The decision places an emphasis on
coercion in patent licensing negotiations, while attempting to realign the
balance of power between licensors and licensees. The realignment,
however, shifts the power far back to licensees, leaving licensors with fewer
options in the realm of licensing. The realignment also creates barriers to
effective and efficient technology transfer. The likely result will be a
chilling of licensing practices.
This paper proceeds in three parts: Part I summarizes the MedImmune
decision; Part II inspects the subsequent decisions by the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit ("CAFC") interpreting MedImmune; and Part III
examines the impact of these decisions on patent practice.
II.
THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN MEDIMMUNE V. GENENTECH

MedImmune, a biotechnology company, manufactures the drug
Synagis, which treats certain respiratory tract diseases in infants and
children.3 Revenue for MedImmune largely depends on sales of Synagis
for which profits reached 942.3 million dollars in 2004. 4 MedImmune's
total revenue in 2004 was only 1.2 billion dollars. 5 So, the majority of
MedImmune's revenue was derived from Synagis alone, and the patents
protecting Synagis were extremely valuable to the company.
In 1997, MedImmune licensed a patent related to chimeric antibodies
and a then-pending application relating to the coexpression of
immunoglobulin chains in recombinant cells from Genentech (and coassignee City of Hope.) 6 The application matured into a patent and
Genentech requested that MedImmune pay additional royalties as described
in the licensing agreement. 7 MedImmune felt that Genentech's patent in
question was invalid and unenforceable, and that Synagis did not infringe8
the patent's claims or owe royalties under the licensing agreement.
Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764 (U.S. 2007).
Id., at 768 (U.S. 2007); See also, Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 28680 (C.D. Cal. Aril 23, 2004) [hereinafter MedImmune I].
Inc.,
Annual
Report
2005,
4 MedImmune,
http://www.medimmune.com/ar/2005/financials/mda4.html (last visited Dec. 27 2007).
5 Id.
6 Medlmmune, supra note 2, at 768.
2
3

7
8

Id.
Id.
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MedImmune, however, did not want to risk treble damages, attorney's fees,
and enjoinment by refusing to pay royalties and willfully infringing the
recently granted patent.9 Therefore, Medlmmune paid the royalties under
protest and sought a declaratory judgment of invalidity, unenforceability,
0
non-infringement and lack of royalty obligation.'
The lower court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction stating that "the license agreement 'obliterated any reasonable
apprehension' that the licensee will be sued for infringement.' "1 In other
words, a licensee in good standing could never bring a declaratory
judgment action. According to the district court, MedImmune and other
patent licensees could either submit to the licensor's demands or they would
have to break the licensing agreement, risk treble damages by continuing to
practice the discovery, or even halt production altogether until the dispute
was resolved. 12 All of the available options had potentially devastating
economic consequences for MedImmune. The CAFC later agreed with and
affirmed the district courts decision to apply CAFC precedent instead of
ninth circuit precedent. 13
The Supreme Court reversed by holding that MedImmune could not
bring a declaratory judgment to challenge the patent's validity. 14 Justice
Scalia delivered the opinion of the court which refocused declaratory
judgment jurisdiction on earlier precedent and Article III justiciability under
the Declaratory Judgment Act. 15 The Declaratory Judgment Act refers to
the type of cases or controversies justiciable under Article III of the United
States Constitution 16 Prior precedent dictated that declaratory judgments
can be a case or controversy under Article 1II. 17 The question then becomes
"whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances show that there is a
substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of
sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory
9 Id.

Id.
II Id., at 768 (citing Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); See
also, MedImmune I, supra note 3.
10

12 MedImmune I, supra note 3, at *9 (MedImmune asserted that Ninth Circuit precedent
should control in the case instead of CAFC precedent because they felt that subject matter
jurisdiction is a procedural matter unrelated to patent law. The district court disagreed
stating that "[t]his decision clearly implicates patent law, and is well within the purview of
the Federal Circuit.").
13 MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 427 F.3d 958 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
14 MedImmune, supra note2, at 769; MedImmune, 427 F.3d 958, 965 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
("The district court did not err in holding that MedImmune, since under no threat or
apprehension of suit, did not have standing to bring a declaratory challenge to the Cabilly I
patent.").
15 Id., at 771; See generally, Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359 (1943).
16 Id.; See also, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2007).
17 Id. (citing Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1933)).
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18

judgment."'
As a result of the Supreme Court's decision, the CAFC's test for
declaratory judgment jurisdiction had been abrogated. 19 The earlier CAFC
precedent had focused on a "reasonable apprehension of suit test."2 The
reasonable apprehension of suit test asked the question if there was "(1) an
explicit threat or other action by the patentee, which creates a reasonable
apprehension on the part of the declaratory judgment plaintiff that it will
face an infringement suit, and (2) present activity which could constitute
infringement or concrete steps taken with the intent to conduct such
activity." 2 1 A licensee in good standing could never fulfill the "reasonable
apprehension" part of the test because a license in good standing removed
any reasonable apprehension that an infringement suit would be instituted.
After all, patent licenses are often considered a license to infringe.
Justice Scalia warned that patents can be used coercively to garner
high royalty payments and inflate the value of a technology. Coercion, he
felt, was present in common business situations where serious economic
injury is threatened. The court analogized to a situation where government
action is threatened. 22 A person threatened with the government action
does not have to subject himself to liability before challenging the law or
regulation. In Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974), the court allowed
a plaintiff to seek a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of a state
statute prohibiting the distribution of handbills instead of risking
prosecution. 23 Additionally, In Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923),
a farmer faced forfeiture of his property if he entered into a lease in
violation of the state's anti-alien act. 24 The threat of enforcement of the act
vested subject matter jurisdiction in the court. A patent licensee would
similarly have to "bet the farm" by breaking the license in order to bring an
25
action challenging the validity of the patent.
Justice Scalia felt that "[a] licensee who pays royalties under
compulsion of an injunction has no more apprehension of imminent harm
than a licensee who pays royalties for fear of treble damages and an

18 Id. (citing Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270 (1941)).
19 Id.; See also, SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1380 (Fed.

Cir. 2007) ("The Supreme Court's opinion in MedImmune represents a rejection of our
reasonable apprehension of suit test.").
20 Id.; See generally Gen-Probe, 359 F.3d 1376 (2004).
21 BP Chems. Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4 F.3d 975, 978 (Fed.Cir.1993).
22 Medlmmune, supra note 2, at 772; See also, Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452
(1974).
23 Id., at 769 (citing Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974)).

24 Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923).
25 MedImmune, supra note 2.
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injunction fatal to his business[,] '' 26 whereas the Federal Circuit felt that
prior precedent was distinguishable because it dealt with injunctive relief.
So, a licensor cannot coerce a licensee into paying royalties without
conferring that licensee with standing. In the past, injunctive relief and fear
of willful infringement would become bargaining chips instead of coercive
entitlements. After MedImmune, the role of these elements changes and
shifts power back into the hands of the potential licensee. The line where
standing is conferred, however, is not brightly drawn.
Justice Thomas, the lone dissenter, felt that licensees should have to
break their license in order to challenge the validity of the underlying
patent. 2 7 To hear declaratory judgments when a license has not been
broken would be to hear a hypothetical case in violation of Article III of the
Constitution. 28 Particularly, he felt that the court should not expand the
concept of coercion from Steffel to parties that voluntarily accept
contractual obligations. 29 Patent licensees voluntarily accept licenses,
albeit often under threat of an infringement suit, but the license are
nonetheless voluntarily.
Steffel applies to the coercive power of
governmental conduct where parties do not voluntarily enter into an
agreement. 30 By applying Steffel to voluntary contractual obligations, the
court was going beyond what Steffel actually stood for. 3 1 Instead,
Medimmune could have avoided the situation by never agreeing to the
license in the first place. Justice Thomas warns that the opinion contains no
limiting principal and "has given every patent licensee ... a free pass
around Article III's requirements for challenging the validity of licensed
32
patents."
II'.
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S REACTION TO MEDIMMUNE V. GENENTECH

The CAFC has faced a variety of situations that present novel
questions regarding declaratory judgment jurisdiction in the wake of the
MedImmune decision. These decisions greatly affect licensing practices
because they drastically lower the bar that was previously required to
challenge the validity of a patent in licensing negotiations. As a result,

26 Id.

27 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
28 U.S. Const. art. I11,
§ 2, cl.1.
29 Medlmmune, supra note 2 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

30 Id., at 781-782 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

31 Id., at 781 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("By holding that the voluntary choice to enter an
agreement to avoid some other coerced choice is itself coerced, the Court goes far beyond
Steffel.").
32

Id.,
at 782 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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parties entering into licensing negotiations must be aware of the potential
consequences and conflicts that may arise. The following section will
summarize several of the CAFC's decision regarding the Medlmmune
decision.
A. SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics,Inc., 480 F. 3d 1372 (Fed Cir.
2007)
SanDisk, as owner of several patents related to flash memory storage,
was approached by STMicroelectronics seeking to discuss a potential crossIn a letter initiating these discussions,
licensing agreement. 33
STMicroelectronics stated that eight patents "may be of interest" to
SanDisk, and later in another letter listed four additional patents that "may
also be of interest." 3 4 In a series of meetings, STMicroelectronics's
attorneys presented to SanDisk an infringement analysis of several SanDisk
products. 35 After business and licensing negotiations broken down,
SanDisk filed a law suit alleging infringement of one of its patents and
seeking a declaratory judgment of noninfringement and invalidity of the
patents discussed during the failed negotiations. 36 The district court
dismissed SanDisk's declaratory judgment action declaring that SanDisk
did not have a reasonable apprehension of suit.3 7 Therefore, the court was
divested of subject matter jurisdiction.
The CAFC vacated and remanded stating that the Medlmmune
decision represented a rejection of the reasonable apprehension of suit test
that the district court applied. 38 Applying Medlmmune, the court found that
STMicroelectronics's activities created "a substantial controversy, between
parties having adverse legal interest, of significant immediacy and reality to
warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment." 39 The infringement
analysis and asserted right to royalties was sufficient to give rise to subject
matter jurisdiction, even though STMicroelectronics had promised not to
sue. 4 0 A promise not to sue is insufficient if the asserting party "shows a
33 SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
34 Id.
35 These meetings were treated as "settlement discussions" which were to be kept
confidential under Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 408. However, the court points out that
since there was no active litigation the Federal Rules of Evidence simply do not apply
because there was not and could not be a claim in dispute. A much simpler solution would
have been to simply sign confidentiality agreements before presenting the infringement
analysis.
36 SanDisk, supra note 33.
37 Id.
38 Id.,
at 1380.

39 Id. (citing Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 272 (U.S.
1941)).
40 Id.
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preparedness and willingness to enforce its patent rights." 4 1
B. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330 (Fed
Cir.2007)
Novartis listed several patents in the Food and Drug Administration's
Orange Book which covered the active ingredient in its drug Famvir and the
associated method of therapeutic use. 4 2 Teva filed an Abbreviated New
Drug Application ("ANDA") for a generic version of Famvir, and in its
paragraph IV certification stated that it did not infringe any of the Novartis
patents, or alternatively that the patents were invalid.4 3 Since paragraph IV
certifications constitute an act of infringement, Novartis filed suit against
44
Teva, but only on the patent covering the active ingredient in Famvir.
Teva then sought a declaratory judgment establishing "patent certainty" that
45
the remaining method patents were "invalid or will not be infringed.
The district court dismissed the declaratory judgment action by
applying the reasonable apprehension of suit test. 46 The CAFC reversed

41

Id.,
at 1383.

42

Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id., at 1330 (Paragraph IV certification refers to 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) which

43

states
a certification, in the opinion of the applicant and to the best of his knowledge, with
respect to each patent which claims the listed drug referred to in clause (i) or which claims a
use for such listed drug for which the applicant is seeking approval under this subsection and
for which information is required to be filed under subsection (b) or (c) of this section(1)that such patent information has not been filed,
(II) that such patent has expired,
(ll) of the date on which such patent will expire, or
(IV) that such patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the
new drug for which the application is submitted; and...
Novartis, within 45 days, could file a suit for patent infringement which invokes an
automatic 30-month stay to delay FDA approval of the ANDA according to 21 U.S.C. §
355(j)(5)(B)(iii) which states:
(iii) If the applicant made a certification described in subclause (IV) of paragraph (2)(A)(vii),
the approval shall be made effective immediately unless, before the expiration of 45 days
after the date on which the notice described in paragraph (2)(B) is received, an action is
brought for infringement of the patent that is the subject of the certification and for which
information was submitted to the Secretary under subsection (b)(1) or (c)(2) of this section
before the date on which the application (excluding an amendment or supplement to the
application), which the Secretary later determines to be substantially complete, was
submitted. If such an action is brought before the expiration of such days, the approval shall
be made effective upon the expiration of the thirty-month period beginning on the date of the
receipt of the notice provided under paragraph (2)(B)(i) or such shorter or longer period as
the court may order because either party to the action failed to reasonably cooperate in
expediting the action, except that-. . .
44 Id.
45 Id., at 1335.
46

Id.
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finding five circumstances that supported Teva's assertion of a justiciable
controversy, which were:
1. Novartis listing of Famvir in the Orange Book;4 7
48
2. Teva submitting an ANDA, which is an act of infringement;
3. the
unfair judicial gaming under the Hatch-Waxman Act by
49
Novartis;
4. the pending infringement litigation involving the same technology
and same parties; 50 and
51
5. the possibility of future litigation over the related method patents.
Under the totality of the circumstances, these five factors established
Teva's standing and an actual controversy sufficient to confer subject
52
matter jurisdiction on the court.
C. Honeywell Int'l Inc. v. UniversalAvionics Sys. Corp., 488 F.3d 982
(Fed.Cir. 2007)
Honeywell alleged patent infringement of five patents related to a
virtual look ahead system used to give terrain or obstacle warnings in
aviation electronics. 53 At the district court, Honeywell withdrew all
previously asserted claims, except for eight specific claims in two of the
patents, some of which were dependent claims. 54 The district court felt that
since Honeywell refused to withdraw all claims Universal Avionics had a
reasonable apprehension of suit. 55 Subsequently, the court maintained
subject matter jurisdiction and several of the withdrawn claims were found
56
to be invalid based on anticipation.
The CAFC affirmed the lower court's decision, and distinguished
GrainProcessing Corp. v. American Maize-Prods. Co., 840 F.2d 902 (Fed.
Cir. 1988) in the process. When "infringement of a dependent claim also
entails infringement of its associated independent claim," the entire subject
matter of the technology will still be at issue. 57 The claims that Honeywell
withdrew were both independent and dependent claims, but the claims that

1341.
1342.
49 Id., at 1342 (According to the court, judicial gaming refers to the practice of
exploiting aspects of the Hatch-Waxman Act to delay generic competition in the
pharmaceutical industry.).
50 Id., at 1344.
51 Id., at 1345.
47 Id., at
48 Id., at

52

Id., at 1346.

53 Honeywell Int'l Inc. v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., 488 F.3d 982 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
54
55
56
57

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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it maintained in its action were all dependent. 5 8 Grain Processing
presented a different situation where a group of process claims were
59
withdrawn from consideration, but a group of product claims remained.
The Court felt that only such a blanket withdrawal, like a withdrawal of a
group of process claims, would divest the court of subject matter
60
jurisdiction.
Unlike Grain Processing, Honeywell left the entire subject matter at
issue because it withdrew independent claims while remaining to assert
some dependent claims. Additionally, Honeywell charged co-defendant
lawsuit. 6 1
Sandel with infringement of the withdrawn patents in another
62
Therefore, the court felt that it properly maintained jurisdiction.
D. Sony Elecs., Inc. v. GuardianMedia Techs., Ltd., 497 F.3d 1271 (Fed.
Cir.2007)
Sony, Mitsubishi, JVC, and Matsushita all brought declaratory
judgment actions against Guardian Media, which attempted to assert patent
rights by initiating licensing negotiations relating to methods and
apparatuses for blocking television programs. 63
The district court
consolidated the actions, and then dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction because Guardian Media had not expressly threatened to sue
any of the plaintiffs for patent infringement. 64 The CAFC reexamined the
licensing attempts in light of Medlmmune, recognizing that "[t]he Supreme
Court has not articulated a bright-line rule for distinguishing those 6cases
5
that satisfy the actual controversy requirement from those that do not."
Despite Guardian Media's statement that "it had 'absolutely no plan
whatsoever to sue' ", the declaratory judgment plaintiffs were not required
to put themselves "at further risk by continuing to engage in the allegedly
infringing activity before seeking a declaration of its rights." 66 The court
also suggested that the Declaratory Judgment Act should be used to prevent
patent holders from engaging in "extra-judicial patent enforcement tactics
[that] rendered its competitors helpless and immobile so long as the patent
owner refused to grasp the nettle and sue." 67 Guardian's tactics included:
58 Id.
59 Id. (citing Grain Processing Corp. v. American Maize-Prods. Co., 840 F.2d 902 (Fed.

Cir. 1988)).
60
61
62
63
64
65

Id.
Id., at 996.
Id.
Sony Elecs., Inc. v. Guardian Media Techs., Ltd., 497 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id.
Id., at 1283.
66 Id., at 1284.
67 Id. (citing Arrowhead Industrial Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 734
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1) alleging specific products infringed its patents; 2) providing detailed
infringement analysis; 3) disputing invalidity assertions; and, 4) requesting
royalties.68 The CAFC determined that these actions gave rise to an actual
controversy, but cautioned that the district court still has discretionary
dismissal and staying power. Thus, the case was remanded to the lower
court.
E. Adenta GmbH v. OrthoArm, Inc., 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 22315 (Fed.Cir.
September 19, 2007)
American Orthodontics Corporation ("American") manufactures
orthodontic brackets for Adenta GmbH ("Adenta"). 69 OrthoArm sued
American for infringement of a patent relating to the brackets American
manufactured for Adenta. 70 OrthoArm and American entered into a
settlement agreement where American would pay a four percent royalty in
exchange for an assignment of the OrthoArm patent. 7 1 Adenta and
American also agreed to a royalty sharing agreement where each party
would pay half of the royalty obligation to OrthoArm. Adenta later
believed that the patent was invalid and advised that it would stop paying
royalties, and American countered that it would "pursue its available legal
remedies to protect its rights." 72 Adenta then filed a complaint seeking a
declaratory judgment that the patent in question was invalid and
unenforceable. 73 In the resulting trial, the district court denied without
prejudice OrthoArm's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction stating that the matter could not be resolved without proper
74
documentation.
The CAFC's de novo review once again determined that the party's
actions gave rise to a justiciable Article III case or controversy under
Medlmmune. 75 American clearly intended to assert its rights under the
terms of the license agreement with Adenta. 76 The statement that American
would "pursue its available legal remedies" indicated this intent and created

(Fed. Cir. 1988)).
68 Id.
69 Adenta GmbH v. OrthoArm, Inc., 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 22315 (Fed. Cir. September

19, 2007).
70 Id.
7'
72
73

Id.
Id.
Id.

74 Adenta GmbH v. Orthoarm Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3020 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 20,
2006).
75 Adenta, supra note 69.
76 Particularly, that it would "pursue all legal remedies."
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a substantial controversy. 77 The court also notes that American's failure to
file an infringement counterclaim was insufficient to divest the court of
subject matter jurisdiction. 78 Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court
decision accepting subject matter jurisdiction.
F. Benitec Austl., Ltd. v. Nucleonics, Inc., 495 F.3d 1340 (Fed.Cir. 2007).
Benitec brought an infringement action against Nucleonics concerning
RNA-based disease therapy. 79 Nucleonics counterclaimed that the patent in
question was invalid and that the accused actions were subject to the
pharmaceutical research exception of 35 U.S.C. § 271 (e). 80 During
discovery, evidence was exposed that suggested that additional inventors
contributed to the subject matter of the patent but were not named as
inventors. 8 1 Benitec, therefore, moved to dismiss its complaint without
prejudice because the Supreme Court had expanded the pharmaceutical
research exception and Benitec no longer felt that they had a colorable
claim of infringement. 8 2 Nucleonics, on the other hand, felt that Benitec's
motion to dismiss was to prevent the patent from being declared invalid.
The district court granted Benitec's motion to dismiss its own claims,
and also dismissed Nucleonic's counterclaim for lack of declaratory
judgment jurisdiction. On review, the CAFC affirmed the dismissal of
Nucleonics' counterclaim because the burden of demonstrating declaratory
judgment jurisdiction rests on party claiming such jurisdiction, and remains
with that party throughout litigation. 83 In dissent, Circuit Judge Dyk felt
that the burden should shift to Benitec because Benitec failed to show that
there will be no future controversy. 84 Under the majority rule, the
continuing burden rests with Nucleonics to establish declaratory judgment
jurisdiction because it was the party to invoke declaratory judgment
jurisdiction. 85 Additionally, the court reasoned that subsequent events to

Id.
Id.
79 Benitec Austi., Ltd. v. Nucleonics, Inc., 495 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
80 35 U.S.C. §271(e) states that "It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer
to sell, or sell within the United States or import into the United States a patented invention
(other than a new animal drug or veterinary biological product (as those terms are used in the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Act of March 4, 1913) which is primarily
manufactured using recombinant DNA, recombinant RNA, hybridoma technology, or other
processes involving site specific genetic manipulation techniques) solely for uses reasonably
related to the development and submission of information under a Federal law which
regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products."
81 Benitec Austl., Ltd. v. Nucleonics, Inc., 495 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
77
78

82
83
84
85

Id.
Id., at 1345.
Id.

Id.
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of jurisdiction such as
the filing of the lawsuit could also divest the court
86
the expanded pharmaceutical research exception.
Nucleonics, however, had future plans to extend its research to animal
applications which may not be covered under the section 271(e) (1)
exception. 87 Therefore, Nucleonics felt that a hearing on the validity of the
patent should be granted. The future plans were subject to a confidentiality
agreement preventing Nucleonics from specifically discussing the plans
with the court. The vagueness of these future plans did not give rise to a
substantial controversy of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the
issuance of a declaratory judgment.
IV.
THE FUTURE OF TECHNOLOGY LICENSING PRACTICES: IMPACT OF
MEDIMMUNE

MedImmune represents a changing tide in the practice of technology
transfer and valuation of patents. In the wake of its holding, standing is
conferred to a wide array of licensees and potential licensees. 8 8 Subsequent
CAFC decisions further expanded these concepts to licensing negotiations,
withdrawing claims at trial, and Orange Book practice. Patent valuation
will also be affected because the ability to challenge the validity of a patent
before or after accepting a license changes the licensing risk calculus.
Medlmmune and the CAFC decisions maintain a pro-technology transfer
stance, but the eventual result will be entirely the opposite. The standing
conferred to licensees is likely to chill the practice of technology transfer
because it drastically increases the transaction costs of licensing. Increased
transaction costs remove economic incentives and create barriers to
efficient technology transfer, all while diminishing patents' economic
value.
A. MedImmune Increases Transaction Costs
Technology transfer refers to the process of licensing patents and
related technology. 89 In a perfect market, patent holders who lack the
ability to enforce and exploit patents would license the patent to the firm

86 See generally, Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp., 57 F.3d 1054 (Fed.
Cir. 1995).
87 Benitec, supra note 79.
88 MedImmune, supra note 2.
89 Sean B. Seymore, The "PrintedPublication" Bar After Klopfenstein: Has the Federal
Circuit Changed the Way Professors Should Talk About Science?, 40 Akron L. Rev. 493,
497 (2007) ("technology transfer offices (TTOs) which strive to "transfer" faculty-generated
inventions from the laboratory to the world of commerce.").
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that could best use it. 90 Transaction costs, however, create an imperfect
market where individuals and entities face barriers to effectively
transferring technology to the best user. The holding in Medlmmune
represents an additional barrier to efficient technology transfer, and thus,
furthers an already imperfect market.
In The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual PropertyLaw, Mark
Lemley identifies several of the innumerable transaction costs in the
licensing of patents. 9 1 These include: lawyer's fees; monitoring the
relationship created by the license; identification of the scope and proper
parties of the license; and valuation of the patent in question. 92 The true
cost of these expenses is uncertain and may vary depending on the subject
matter of the technology and complexity of the transaction. It is clear,
however, that the cost is not trivial; Lemley estimates that the cost
represents "as much as twenty percent of the total value of the underlying
technology license, or in excess of $ 100,000 per transaction." 9 3 By giving
standing to licensees and potential licensees, the Medlmmune decision
makes these transaction costs even greater and more imposing.
For instance, a lawyer drafting patent licenses will now have to
94
consider alternative contract provisions avoiding declaratory judgments.
The monetary cost of actually drafting the provisions may be minimal, but
the transaction costs will greatly increase. Transaction costs cannot be
measured simply in dollars and cents, but must also consider lost
opportunities and other consequences not easily quantifiable. Licensors
faced with the decision to license a patent under an agreement that limits
the availability of a declaratory judgment, or creates hurdles to declaratory
judgments, may be apprehensive to consider and agree to the license. As
the court indicated in SanDisk, licensors and licensees may have to agree to
confidentiality agreements before even discussing the possibility of a
license. 95
Both additional contract provisions and confidentiality
agreements add expenditures and risk to the licensing process.

90 John R. Allison, et al., Frontiers of Intellectual Property: Software Patents,
Incumbents, and Entry, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1579 (2007).
91 Id, at 1614.
92 Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75
Tex. L. Rev. 989, 1053 (1997) ("This list is non-exclusive, but indicates some of the

potential problems that parties may face in a licensing negotiation.").
93 Id. (citations omitted).
94 Stephanie Chu, Operation Restoration: How Can Patent Holder Protect Themselves
from Medlmmune, 2007 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 8 (2007).
95 SanDisk, supra note 33, at n. I ("To avoid the risk of a declaratory judgment action,
ST could have sought SanDisk's agreement to the terms of a suitable confidentiality
agreement. The record before us reflects that the parties did not enter into such an
agreement. Rather, ST sought to condition its open licensing discussions and the
infringement study on adherence to Federal Rule of Evidence 408.").
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Beyond the increase in fees for drafting and negotiating a license, the
possibility of litigation greatly increases as well. It may become the
standard procedure to challenge a patent on its validity before accepting a
license. 96 Additional legal fees represent another barrier to licensing that
may prevent some patent holders from entering the market at all. Small
businesses and independent inventors may view the risk of litigation as
insurmountable when considering licensing practices, when previously
these groups would have transferred the patent rights to the best user.
The transaction costs of monitoring the relationship created by a
licensing agreement will also increase in difficulty and uncertainty after
Medlmmune. 97 Patent licensors will have to monitor the activities of
licensees closely and analyze the risk of facing a declaratory judgment.
Current patent licensees will certainly be reassessing the validity of the
patents in their outstanding licenses. As the Adenta court indicated, the
mere existence of a license and the intent to enforce it will confer subject
matter jurisdiction on the court. 98 So, the transaction costs of monitoring a
relationship will increase because both parties will be seeking judicial
review whenever a conflict arises instead of negotiating.
Determining the proper parties and scope of the license also presents
problems. Markets are imperfect, so the best user of a patent is not always
clear. Entities cannot seek to license to a broad group of potential licensees
like in Sony or SanDisk without being subject to multiple validity
challenges. 99 Instead, licensors will have to carefully consider each
individual licensee, and determine whether the risk associated with seeking
a license outweighs the risk of a validity challenge. As presented, the
situation indicates that patents will not be transferred to the best user, but
will actually be given to the least risky user. So, the costs in determining
the proper party increases along with the risk that any party may jointly or
individually seek to invalidate the patent in question.
While the exact costs of MedImmune are uncertain, it is clear that
licensors and licensee will face an increase in costs associated with
licensing. Increased transaction costs remove economic incentives to
license patents and technology. The risk calculus changes by placing
additional burdens on the patent holder. Burdens represent a barrier to
patent licensing by decreasing economic incentives, and furthering an
already imperfect market.
96 Although, if the patent was strong enough to withstand a challenge to the validity then
the patent holder would have a stronger position to negotiate. The patent holder also would
not have to license the patent to the challenger. Thus, the risk of lost opportunity remains in
the background of these challenges.
97 Lemley, supra note 92.
98 Adenta, supra note 69.
99 See, Sony, supra note 63; SanDisk, supra note 33.
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B. MedImmune Adds Difficulty in Determining Patent Value
Perhaps most importantly, MedImmune represents an added difficultly
in determining the value of patents. Value is essentially a function of risk
where firms balance the risk of being found liable for infringement with the
cost of securing a license. 100 A finding of infringement can be extremely
costly because the damages are trebled upon a finding of willfulness. The
litigation expenses may be prohibitive too.' 0 1 So, a firm may negotiate a
license instead of going to going to court just to save time and money.
Even when a firm is virtually certain to win an infringement suit, it may be
cheaper to simply accept a license rather than go to court. MedImmune,
however, adds another factor in licensing or litigation analysis: the risk of
the patent in question being declared invalid before licensing or litigation
ever occurs.
The result is a shift in the balance of power in licensing negotiations.
Licensors lose power to threaten an infringement suit, and licensees gain
the power to threaten to bring a declaratory judgment against the licensors.
Therefore, the risk partially shifts away from the licensee to the patent
holder. Since value is a function of risk, the value of the patent will
certainly be affected.
The valuation problem is only compounded by eBay v.
MercExchange, where the Supreme Court eliminated the presumption that
an injunction is granted as a matter of course upon a finding of
infringement. 10 2
In addition to facing a validity challenge of their
licensees, after eBay patent licensors, particularly non-practicing entities,
may not be able to secure injunctive relief. Instead, the court may grant an
ongoing royalty rate in lieu of an injunction if a balancing of the traditional
four factor injunction test favors the plaintiff. 10 3 eBay will lower patent
value because of the lost certainty of an injunction. Again, the risk is
lowered for the licensee because even though they may face damages, an
injunction will not be granted as a matter of course. The diminished value
of patents represents another barrier to the already difficult process of
technology transfer.

100 John R. Allison, et al., Valuable Patents, 92 Geo. L.J. 435, 440 (Mar. 2004) ("Parties
arguing over a patent worth $ 1 million in damages may have little incentive to litigate their
claim, because the cost of litigation will eat up much of the surplus.").
101 Id., at 440 ("Total direct litigation costs for the median patent case with between $ 1
million and $ 25 million at stake were $ 2 million per side in 2003 and those figures do not
take into account either the higher mean (some cases cost much more) or other costs in lost
employee productivity and uncertainty.").
102 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (U.S. 2006).
103 Id., at 391 ("According to well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking a
permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant such relief.").
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V.
CONCLUSION

While attempting to cure an imbalance in the negotiation power of
licensors and licensees, the Supreme Court has simply shifted the power
from licensors to licensees. The power shift is problematic for patent
holders who face increased transaction costs in licensing. Patent holders
may now be reluctant to seek licenses altogether because of the additional
barriers in licensing negotiations. The shift in power diminishes economic
incentives to license by increasing transaction costs and lowering the value
of patents. The likely result is a chilling of technology transfer.

